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The optimal location of Coast Guard Recruiting Offices and
their recruiter allocation is investigated. Since quantity
of recruits is not a problem with the Coast Guard, a reward
model is developed to rate the quality potential of a
recruiting area. This multiplicative model assumes that
Navy recruiting performance can be used to predict Coast
Guard recruiting potential. Integer dynamic programming is
applied to determine the optimal allocation of recruiters
using the reward model. A non-integer dynamic programming
algorithi is also presented as a decision aid that can be
used for recruiter allocation, quota assignment, bouFidary
definition, recruiter performance evaluation, and recruiter
time allocation. Paucity and possible errors in the Coast
Guard data precluded strong conclusions about the reward
model and subsequent results.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EACKGROUND 9
A. PECRUITING IN THE ARMED FORCES 9
B. RECRUITING IN THE COAST GUARD 10
C. POSSIBLE METHODS TO OBTAIN BETTER RECRUITS
IN THE COAST GUARD 15
D. OPTIMAL RECRUITING OFFICE LOCATION 16
II. RECRUITING OFFICE LOCATION MODELS 19
A. THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY MODELS 19
B. THE COAST GUARD RELATIVE TO THE OTHER
SERVICES 21
C. THE COAST GUARD REWARD MODEL FOR OPTIMAL
LOCATIONS 22
D. OPTIMAL LOCATIONS VIA THE REWARD MODEL .... 27
III. MODEL ESTIMATICN 31
A. IDEAL CONDITIONS 31
B. DATA AVAIIABLE 34
C. THE VARIAEIES USED IN THE REWARD MODEL .... 37
D. REWARD ASSIGNMENT 40
E. INITIAL REGRESSION USING STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS SYSTEM 41
F. REGRESSION RESULTS 42
IV. DETERMINING OPTIMAL LOCATION WITH DYNAMIC
PROGRAMMING 45
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 45
B. THE APPLICATION OF DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING .... 46
C. NON-INTEGER SOLUTION 49
D. THE INTEGZB SOLUTION USING DYNAMIC
PROGRAMMING 51




LIST OF REFERENCES 66
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 68
LIST OF TABLES
I- AFQT Mental Categories ty Percentile 11
II. Recruit Training Success by AFQT Category .... 12
III. HSG vs. Non-HSG Survival 13
IV. Potential Coast Guard Recruiting Office
Locations 51
7. Zi Values For All Locations 53
VI. Lovest Zi Values 54
VII. Optimal Allocation of Recruiters 55
LIST OF FIGORES
1.1 Percent of AFQT Category I and II Accessions . . 14
3.1 Reward as a Function of Effort 31
U.I Dynamic Erogramming Formulation U6
I. BACKGROUND
A. EZCRUITING IN THE ARMED FORCES
Prior to 1973 there was relatively little effort
expended on recruiting for the Armed .Forces. If there was a
monthly or annual enlistment quota shortfall the remaining
quota goals would be filled by draftees. This made the
recruiting process quite easy and both quality and quantity
goals were obtained. As a result there was little incentive
to improve recruiting methods and only a few studies were
conducted to advance these mediocre practices.
In 1S73 when Congress abolished the draft, all of the
major services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) were
forced into a position which required aggressive recruiting
to obtain the needed enlistees. Thus the first major
recruiting studies centered around the effects of and issues
related to the all-vclunteer military system. As early as
1970, the Report cf the President's Commission on an
All-Vclunteer Armed Force [Eef. 1] foresaw the need for
improved recruiting methods under an all-volunteer system.
During the past decade numerous recruiting studies
ranging from behavioral science research to intricate econo-
metric modeling have been conducted. These studies, along
vith increased emphasis on threshold enlistment standards,
have resulted in very sophisticated recruiting methodolo-
gies. The models developed have identified two basic groups
of factors that influence recruiting. The environmental-
demographic factors include such things as unemployment
rates, civilian pay, qualified military available (17 to 21
year olds) , and propensity to enlist, whereas the recruiting
system factors include recruiting objectives, advertising,
recruiting policy, entry programs available, etc.
One conclusion of these studies is that military
recruiting is a highly dynamic process and therefore must be
under constant analysis to remain effective. In recent
years when unemployment was high all of the services enjoyed
a good recruiting period. However, each of the services
continues to research better methods since a poor economy is
a temporary state. Presently two factors affecting
recruiting are declining unemployment and declining target
population (end of the baby boom) . These changing circum-
stances make it necessary to continue forecasting and modi-
fying recruiting techniques.
B. EECHDITING IN THE COAST GDARD
In recent years the Coast Guard has also developed a
need for improved and more aggressive recruiting techniques.
Prior to 1975 the Coast Guard enjoyed 'easy picking'
compared to the other services since there was a high demand
for the Coast Guard and relatively few positions available.
This resulted in a high percentage of good quality recruits
compared to the other services. Today, with more complex
and sophisticated systems and equipment used by the Coast
Guard, there is an even greater need for quality people in
the Coast Guard. This greater need combined with increased
competition for recruits from the other services requires
that the Coast Guard become more aggressive in its
recruiting activities.
The term 'quality* is often used loosely within
recruiting circles, yet it is difficult to define explic-
itly, and even more difficult to measure and predict. Since
the definition and measurement of a 'quality Coast Guard
Eecruit' is beyond the scope of this study, a 'quality'
recruit will be defined in terms of two measures; mental
aptitude and level of education.
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The first measure, mental aptitude, is determined by the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVA3). This
test cf mental aptitude is administered to all potential
Coast Guard recruits prior to their enlistment. The test
measures the level cf skills for several items such as;
arithmetic reasoning, numerical operations, paragraph
comprehension, word knowledge, coding speed, general
science, mathematics knowledge, electronics information,
mechanical comprehension and automotive-shop information.
This battery of tests is administered throughout the country
for all the services with the results of the word knowledge,
paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and numerical
operations sections being combined to form the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) . The AFQT score is then divided
into five "Mental Category" groups based on percentile as
TABLE I
AFQT Mental Categories by Percentile













shown in Table I . Categories I and II represent people
that are above average in trainabili ty ; those in Category
III are considered average, where IIIA represents individ-
uals slightly above the median and IIIB represents those
slightly below the median; those in Category IV are below
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average; and Category V are well telow average. As pcinted
out in the Profile of American Youth [Ref. 2], "The Services
prefer enlistees in the higher AFQT categories because
training time and associated costs are lower." These higher
category people also qualify for a wider range of special-
ized training. Alsc^ as noted by Mobley, Hand, Eaker, and
Meglino, [Ref, 3] persons in the higher mental categories
tend to exhibit a tetter chance of completing recruit
training over those of the lower mental categories. This is
supported by recent Coast Guard data as shown in Table II .
TABLE II
Recruit Trairing Success by AFQT Category
Recruit Training FY-82
G radu ated
Category I 5 II 97. 9%
Category IIIA 96.8%
Category IIIB 93. ^%






The second factor that is considered important relative
to quality is the level of education. In a recent study by
the Center for Naval Analysis [Ref. 4], it was concluded
that
:
Finally, the military has found high school graduates to
be tetter "quality" recruits than non-high school gradu-
ates (quality as measured by retention) . High school
graduation, in fact is the most important predictor of
survival.
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There have been numerous studies conducted which have the
same conclusion and €ven Coast Guard data from fiscal year
1982 supports this conclusion as shown in Table III .
TABLE III





Overall Average 81.2% 18.8%
Although there may be many variables involved in deter-
mining a 'quality* recruit, substantial research has'indi-
cated that mental category and level of education attainment
are valid predictors of future success in training [Ref. 5].
These measures are also readily available for each recruit
and AFCT mental category is standardized nationally. For
the purposes of the Coast Guard and this study, a 'good
quality recruit' is defined as a high school graduate with a
AFQT Category I or II.
With the definition of quality at hand it is now
possible to evaluate the Coast Guard's recruiting position.
Due to the relatively small number of enlistees brought into
the Coast Guard, quantity was never a real concern and
continues to be no concern at the present time. However,
quality recruits and quality minority recruits are less
abundart in the Coast Guard as compared to previous years.
As can te seen in Figure 1.1, there has been a steady
13
decline in percentage of Mental Categories I and II in the
Coast Guard from 1975 until 1981. In 1981 unemployment
became very high aid all of the services experienced good
recruiting. As mentioned earlier this is only a temporary
condition and tougher recruiting times lie ahead. This
decrease in quality in the Coast Guard represents a threat
to life, and property as equipment becomes more complex and
training costs increase. To maintain a high quality and
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Figure 1.1 Percent of AFQT Category I and II Accessions-
The basic assumption behind many recent studies is that
the upper mental category people (Cat I-IIIA) are 'supply
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limited' [Eef. 5]. This means that the number of quality
accessions is limited by the supply of these people rather
than the military's demand for them. Since the four major
services are all competing for these upper mental category
people, the Coast Guard must also compete for these people.
The Coast Guard can nc longer sit back and rely on its repu-
tation for attracting high quality recruits. The Coast
Guard must improve its recruiting techniques to compete with
the much more sophisticated methods used by the ether
services. In a time when budgets are tight the Coast Guard
must make an effort to get more recruits for the dollar and
this can be done by improving the present recruiting
process.
C. POSSIBLE METHODS TO OBTAIN BETTER RECROITS IN THE COAST
GUARD
Initial investigation of the problem resulted in several
possible solutions. For the Coast Guard's recruiting
problem a combination of these solutions and those found in
studies conducted by the other services on recruiting
resulted in several viable alternatives for improvements.
Assuming that improved quality in recruits and minority
recruits (as measured by the mental category) is the goal of
the Coast Guard the following list of solutions is obtained:
1. Train the recruiters better. With better training
the recruiters may become more efficient and effec-
tive salesmen.
2. Advertise more.
3. Offer better and more flexible enlistments such as
guaranteed schools or duty stations, and delayed
entry programs.
U. Use more recruiters in more locations.
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5. P.elccate present recruiting offices into areas of
greater potential. If upper mental category people
with a propensity to enlist in the military are
supply limited, the the Coast Guard should recruit in
areas with the greatest supply.
While all of the above proposals may be good ideas for
improvement, some may be expensive and difficult to imple-
ment. Because of Coast Guard Headquarters interest, this
study will concentrate solely on the fifth proposal, the
relocation of the recruiting offices into the 'optimal'
locations. This presents a challenging problem with
possibly the greatest payoffs relative to the effort and
money expended.
D. OPTIMAL EECEOITING OFFICE LOCATION
There are presently sixty-five Coast Guard Recruiting
Offices throughout the continental United States, Puerto
Eico, and Hawaii. These offices have one to eight recrui-
ters assigned to them for a total of 242 recruiters. Each
office is responsible for recruiting within a geographical
area assigned by Coast Guard Headquarters. This geograph-
ical area is usually defined by a list of counties that make
up the territory of responsibility. Most of the recruiting
is done within a sixty mile radius of the office. There is
no incentive to recruit people of quality greater than a
minimum standard, hence a recruiter can reach the quota
without canvassing the complete territory. The data for
Coast Guard enlistments in FY83 show that most of the appli-
cants and eventual accessions come from only a few of the
counties assigned to a given office. This suggests that
while the Coast Guard may assign most of the counties in the
U.S. to recruiting offices, it cannot be assumed that the
Coast. Guard is actually covering the entire country. It may
16
be safer to assume that the Coast Guard actively recruits in
or.ly sixty-five specific locations. If the Coast Guard does
not inplement new policies which require recruiters to
canvass more of their assigned areas, then the location of
the recruiting office becomes even more significant.
The present Coast Guard recruiting office locations
appear to be an ad hoc selection based on some unknown
parameters and constraints. There is no documentation
available to explain the locations or thought processes
involved in selection. While information as to why the
offices are located where they are is not available, it can
still be noted that location is very important and reloca-
tion may be necessary to optimize recruiting effort and
expenditure. Assuming that most of the enlistees come from
the immediate counties of a recruiting office's territory,
the offices should be placed in locations with large numbers
of highly qualified youths that have a propensity to enlist
in the military. While these three factors, good quality,
large number of youths, and propensity to enlist, are not
all inclusive in determining a good location, they are a
good starting point for evaluation.
In summary, the Coast Guard realizes that it must
improve its recruiting process to maintain a population of
high quality individuals in a high quality service. Due to
the limited resources for Coast Guard recruiting and the
fact that Coast Guard recruiters concentrate most of their
effort within a small radius of the office, the actual loca-
tion of the office becomes very important. The Coast Guard
Enlisted Recruiting Branch has expressed some concern over
the present locations of Coast Guard recruiting offices.
Some cities without Coast Guard recruiting offices seem to
have a lot of potential and produce well for the ether
services, while other cities with Coast Guard offices are
unlikely choices. Fcr example, the Coast Guard has three
17
offices with a total of eleven recruiters in the state of
North Carolina, while there are only three offices ar.d ten
recruiters in all of Southern California. Based on popula-
tion and the amount of Coast Guard activity in these two
locations, there appears to be some discrepancy in recruiter
location. Discrepancies such as this indicate that the
present location of recruiting offices may not be 'optimal'.
Eelocaticn of the recruiting offices is a step towards
improved recruiting. If the offices can be located in areas
that have a large number of high guality youths with a
propensity to enlist in the service then the Coast Guard
should be able to improve the guality of enlistees with less
effort.
18
II. lECEOITING OFFICE LOCATION MODELS
A. THE ABHY, AIR FOECE, AND NAVY MODELS
Most of the academic literature on recruiting has
concentrated on the influence of the civilian- military pay
ratio and the civilian unemployment rate. Although these
two factors are obviously significant in forecasting enlist-
ments into the military, they are not ail-inclusive. As a
result of recent studies and advancements in knowledge of
military recruiting, the models used by the major services
to predict enlistments have become much more sophisticated.
Many possible variables that influence recruiting have been
identified and tested. Extensive research has resulted in
similar supply models for each of the services.
The major services have divided potential recruits into
two classes, "supply limited," and "demand limited." The
supply limited class consists of mental category I-IIIA high
school graduates without prior military service. These
people rank in the upper 50th percentile on the ASVAB Test
(Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery), have graduated
from high school, and do not have any previous military
service. This group is considered supply limited because
the number of accessions into the military from this group
of people is limited by the supply available and not the
military's demand. In essence, this group of individuals
has teen identified as desirable for military enlistments.
The "demand" class of people consists of the mental category
IIIB and below (lower 50th percentile on the ASVAB Test) or
non- high school graduates and GEDs (graduate eguivalency
diploma) , with prior and non prior service personnel
combined. This group appears to be constrained by the limit
that each of the services will allow.
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since the supply limited recruit is the goal, each of
the services has developed an enlistment supply model that
relies on the assumption that the category I-IIIA nonprior
service high school graduate is a limited resource for
enlistment into the military. Tnis supply model is used in
making decisions about recruiter allocation, budgeting,
advertising, etc.. lo describe the enlistment supply model
the Cobb-Douglas function is used [Ref, 5, and 6] with the
general form as follows:
ao ,al ..a2 „an
Y = e X^ A^ ••• \ (2.1)
where Y represents the supply limited accessions or depen-
dent variable, Xi's are the independent variables repre-
senting the recruiting and environmental factors, and the
ai's are the exponents of e and the independent variables.
The Ccbb-Douglas function is intuitively appropriate in
recruiting because of the property of diminishing returns.
The environmental and recruiting factors, or independent
variables, vary with each service. Some of the irajor
factors found in these models are number of recruiters or
effort, gualified military available (17-21 year olds),
unemployment levels, youth attitude towards the military,
advertising, recruiter experience, office workload, and
previous accessions [Bef. 5, 7, and 8]. While these factors
are not exhaustive, they represent the major ones which are
incorporated into the models. When building these models it
is necessary to avoid using too many factors to describe the
supply function. As Beswick [Ref. 7] points out there are
two possible problems with each factor. First, an appro-
priate measure for each variable must be made. In many
cases the appropriate measure is not obvious. For example,
it is net obvious what the appropriate measure is for the
youth attitude towards the military. A second problem
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involves which variables to include in the model and identi-
fying the functional interaction between the variables
chosen. It is for these reasons that a minimal number of
explanatory variables should be used to describe the supply
response.
B. TEE COAST GUARD RELATIVE TO THE OTHER SERVICES
As discussed above, the other services use their models
to assist in making recruiting decisions about recruiter
allocation, budgeting, advertising, number of recruiters,
assignment of recruiting goals, forecasting enlistments,
performance evaluation, and office locations and boundaries.
The Coast Guard is also faced with recruiting decisions.
However, the recruiting branch does not have a Coast Guard
supply model to assist in these decisions. Because of major
differences such as size, resources, and requirements, the
Coast Guard cannot directly employ one of the ether
service's models.
The Coast Guard has very limited resources such as
money, recruiters, and locations. The number of recruiting
offices is a good example to contrast the Coast Guard with
the other major services. The Coast Guard has sixty-five
recruiting offices whereas the Navy has about 1300 and the
Army and Air Force have similar numbers. The number of
recruiters is also significant, but then so is the number of
recruits that each service must obtain. The quantity of
recruits is easily achieved in the Coast Guard as evidenced
by a recent Commandant's Bulletin [Ref. 9], suspending all
enlistments until 1 October (the beginning of the fiscal
year). For the Coast Guard quality is the major concern.
The present goal of Coast Guard recruiting is to enlist high
quality white and minority high school graduates to maintain
an efficient and eff€ctive service. A combination of a few
21
administrative policy changes and the optimal location of
recruiting offices can be used to obtain this goal.
The optimal location of Coast Guard recruiting offices
presents a challenging problem for a supply model. If a
valid supply model for the Coast Guard can be developed,
then it is possible to rate the potential of any location
and subsequently make a decision to place or remove a
recruiting office. As noted earlier the major services use
their supply models for various recruiting decisions. Since
the Coast Guard's goal is to obtain optimal location for its
present sixty-five offices and 242 recruiters, the subseq-
uent supply model will concentrate on this specific goal.
C. TEE COAST GUARD BEWARD MODEL FOR OPTIMAL LOCATIONS
In developing a supply model for the Coast Guard there
exist several problems which must be overcome. The three
major problems are the Coast Guard quota system and
resulting bias of recruiting data, the restriction of avail-
able Coast Guard data to sixty-five specific locations, and
the limited data available to develop a good model.
The first problem is a result of the Coast Guard's
present quota policy. To determine the quota for a
recruiting office, the Coast Guard starts with a forecast of
the total number of recruits needed for the year. Eased on
expected attrition, this number is then divided into twelve
monthly quotas. This figure is then divided by the total
number of recruiters in the Coast Guard to yield a monthly
quota for each recruiter. The quota for each office is
simply the monthly quota per recruiter multiplied by the
number of recruiters assigned to the office. This method
assumes equal productivity among recruiters. Since quotas
are usually met, this system does not seem to present a
problem for quartity of recruits. However, an improved
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quota assignment method may improve quality of recruits and
deserves some consideration. Also, the number of recruits
from each office is directly proportional to the number of
recruiters assigned, hence it is not possible to evaluate
the potential of an office by using number of enlistments
alone.
To alleviate this problem, the Coast Guard supply model
is altered to become a 'reward' model. The other services'
supply models use number of enlistments as the dependent
variable because this is the number that they are interested
in predicting. Because of the waiting lists to join the
Coast Guard, the Coast Guard is not as interested in the
number of enlistments as it is in the quality of its enlist-
ments. Because of the emphasis on quality as opposed to
quantity, it is not necessary to use the number of enlist-
ments as the dependent variable in the Coast Guard model.
Using this simplifying assumption, the Coast Guard model
becomes a reward function where each office is given a
reward value based on the quality of its recruiting.
The reward function developed for the Coast Guard is a
result of subjective weighting of five basic factors;
quality enlistments, quality minority enlistments, total
number of accessions that have survived at least nine months
of service, total number of minority accessions that have
survived at least nine months of service, and total number
of applicants. The quality factor is measured by the total
number of mental category I and II high school graduates
with no prior service that enlisted in a given office. As
mentioned before, this appears to be an accepted measure of
quality and this information is readily available. The
quality minority factor is the same as the quality factor
except it records only the minorities in this category. The
total accessions (minority and non-minority) , that have
survived at least nine months of service is a result of the
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fiscal year 1983 accessions that were still in the Coast
Guard at the time of this study. This measure represents
survivors and therefore good recruits. It also buffers the
hias due to the quota system, since survivors are not
directly proportional to number of recruiters, hence there
is a slightly lower correlation between the two. The final
factor, total number of applicants, is also readily avail-
able and represents a measure similar to total enlistments
for the ether services. Since there is no quota on appli-
cants, the total number is not forced to be directly propor-
tional to the number of recruiters, hence a small office
with two recruiters may have more applicants then a large
office with six recruiters. The weighting of these factors
was arrived at by a survey of Coast Guard recruiting experts
and will be discussed further in Chapter III below.
The second problem results from having only sixty-five
recruiting offices spread over the entire country. In the
case of the Navy, there are approximately 1300 recruiting
offices throughout the country. With this type of coverage
the Navy has recruiting data for any location that it may
want tc consider. This allows the Navy to evaluate the
potential of a given office location and then reallocate
recruiters accordingly. The Coast Guard cannot use its data
to evaluate the potential of a recruiting office which does
not exist. For example, there is no way for the Coast Guard
to use cnly Coast Guard recruiting data to evaluate the
potential cf an office in Anchorage, Alaska, since there is
no office there and hence no source of Coast Guard data.
One possible solution to this problem is to develop some
relationship between Coast Guard recruiting and Navy
recruiting. If there is a valid relationship, then it would
be possible to evaluate the potential of locations such as
Anchorage using Navy data. It may be possible to develop a
valid relationship based on the similarities of the two sea
24
going services without assuming that the characteristics of
a Navy enlistee are the same as those of a Coast Guard
enlistee. The psychological aspect involved in an individu-
al's decision process for enlisting into either service is
heyond the scope of this study. It is reasonable to assume
that if the Navy is capable of recruiting good quality
people for a given area then the Coast Guard should have
some relative potential in that area also.
The final problem deals with sparse Coast Guard data.
Since the Coast Guard enlists only between 4000 and 6000
recruits each year, the resulting recruiting data is very
limited. For example, the number of quality minorities per
office has a range of zero to five for fiscal year 1983,
with mcst of them falling at zero, one, two, or three. As a
result an increase by one or two in this category of recruit
brings about a 100 to 200 percent increase in the value of
this variable. This can cause difficulties when regressing
against some weighted value of this variable. This sparse
data is compounded by recruits that come from outlying coun-
ties of a recruiting office territory. For example, the
Omaha recruiting office has a territory of about ninety
counties throughout Nebraska. From these ninety counties
the two counties which are in the immediate vicinity of the
office produce about seventy percent of the recruits. It is
reasonable to assume that most of the recruiting effort is
concentrated in these two counties, hence the remaining
counties are not actively recruited by the Coast Guard. In
comparing the Coast Guard with the Navy, it is necessary to
compare only these two counties since they are the only two
that the Coast Guard makes an effort to recruit from. If
all ninety counties were compared then the results would be
misleading because the Navy has offices and actively
recruits in some of these counties that the Coast Guard
cannot cover. In the case of Omaha, there is a loss of
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about thirty percent of the data by using only the two coun-
ties fcr comparison tc the Navy. This loss summed up over
all locations results in a much smaller amount of useful
data. The overall effect is that the useful Coast Guard
data is very limited and the relationship that is developed
through regression with Navy recruiting data should be
treated with caution.
Keeping in mind the three major problems as mentioned
above. Coast Guard quota system, limited number of loca-
tions, and limited amount of useful data, a Coast Guard
'reward' model can be developed. The model is a multiplica-
tive model with the dependent variable defined as the reward
assigned to each office and the independent variables are
the relevant Navy variables, and number of Coast Guard
recruiters. The Coast Guard quota system and interest in
quality justifies the use of a reward value for each office.
For example, the Coast Guard would prefer an office that
produces many category I and II, and minority category I and
II accessions with only a few recruiters, over an office
that requires many recruiters to produce only a few category
I and II, and minority category I and II accessions. It is
reasonable then, tc evaluate each office based on some
reward level as a function of the quality of accessions
obtained.
The limited number of Coast Guard locations results in
using the Navy data as the most convenient set of indepen-
dent variables. This Navy data is readily available and is
logically relevant to the problem at hand. It is reasonable
to assume that there is a correlation between Navy and Coast
Guard recruiting results. Using the reward value to regress
against the Navy data results in the following model:
Reward = f(Navy data, * of C.G. Recruiters) (2.2)
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It is this reward mcdel which will subsequently be used as
the driving force in determining the optimal location. The
final prcblem of the limited amount of useful Coast Guard
data suggests that any decisions based on this model must be
treated with caution.
D. OPTIHAL LOCATIONS VIA THE SEWARD MODEL
To determine the optimal location of recruiting offices
for the Coast Guard there must exist a valid reward model.
Assume this model is of the form
R = f( x^, x^, ... > \' '^ ^ (2.3)
where the X*s are the various explanatory variables
mentioned earlier and d is the decision variable, number of
recruiters. Then it is possible to use this function as a
recruiting decision aid. The first step in applying this
model is to define the problem in terms of the model. Since
the Coast Guard wants to optimize their recruiting office
locations the logical step is to optimize the reward func-





where Ei is the reward for office i and N is the total
number cf recruiting offices under consideration. To
complete the problem there must be some constraints added to
the system or the solution might result in a office at every
location considered.
The constraint for the Coast Guard's problem is the
total number of recruiters available in the Coast Guard.
This number is 242 at the present time with an additional
constraint that there must be at least two and not more than
six recruiters in any office. This second constraint is a
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result cf administrative reguireaents. The resulting
problem may be described as follows:
N
Max Y. ^. (2*^^
N
s.t. Z ^^ " 242
1=1 ^
2ld < 6 for all i.
where di is the number of Coast Guard recruiters for office
i. Given this formulation, the question remains of hew to
solve it.
The method used for the Coast Guard problem involves
applying a dynamic programming technique similar to the one
used by Beswick [Ref. 10] in an application for Air "Force
recruiting. In the Air Force problem, Beswick proposes a
"response function" as follows:
"i = ^x < " -X ' (2.6)
where
r = number of reservations in office i,
z = all of the explanatory variables for office i with
the exception of recruiting effort,
t = man-months of effort in office i, and
C = a constant.
This multivariate response function was derived using a
non-linear regression method. Beswick then applied a
dynamic programming algorithm with t , man-months of effort
in each office i, as the decision variable to solve the
problem given by equation 2.7 , where T is the total number
of Air Force Recruiters.
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Max f r. (2.7;
i=l "
n
S.t Z t = 12T
1=1
A comparison of equations 2.5 and 2.7 shows two very
similar problems. To apply the dynamic programming method
to the Coast Guard problem there are a few adjustments to be
made. First the reward model must be a function of Coast
Guard recruiting effort (i.e. Coast Guard recruiting effort
must be one of the explanatory variables) . As a result the
reward model may be written as follows:
R^ = Z^ d^ (2.8)
where
Bi = the reward at office i,
Zi = a value determined by the Navy explanatory vari-
ables for office i,
di = the number of Coast Guard recruiters for office i,
and
a = the exponent for di derived from the regression.
Because of the relatively small number of Coast Guard
Recruiters, the variable d was chosen as the number of
recruiters for an office instead of the man-month effort or
some other percentage of recruiting effort. Since d is the
decision variable and must be an integer, the resulting
dynamic programming algorithm must result in an integer
solution. The added constraint of at least two and not more
than six recruiters jer office is also incorporated in the
dynamic programming solution.
Assuming a valid reward model, the application of the
dynamic programming algorithm should produce a list of
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offices with the corresponding number of recruiters that




To develop a gocd reward function it is necessary to
define and understand the model. As mentioned before, a
icultiplicative factor model will be used to describe the
reward function for Coast Guard recruiting. This type of
model is intuitively convenient since it allows the case of
diminishing returns cf reward as a function of effort.
Several studies on market response to sales force have
concluded that there are diminishing returns as a function








Pigure 3.1 Beward as a Function of Effort.
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Assuming that this multiplicative factor model is appro-
priate, the first step to building the model is identifying
all possible components. It is hypothesized that the reward
function is affected by both environmental-demographic
conditions and recruiting system factors. The first set of
conditions, environmental-demographic, are not directly
controllable by the Coast Guard; however, recruiting office
location can be adjusted to optimize these conditions. The
second set of factors, those of the recruiting system, is
more directly controlled by the Coast Guard within the
limits of budget constraints and Congressional rulings, and
therefore should be heavily scrutinized to insure effective
recruiting.
The Coast Guard recruits heavily from the age group of
17-21 years old, hence the relative number of youths in this
category should have a positive influence on recruiting.
This group is commonly referred to as the "qualified mili-
tary available" (QMA) , the youths in the age group of 17-21,
that are physically and mentally qualified, and available
for military service [Ref. 5]. This factor, QUA, is consid-
ered an important factor in the supply models of all the
other services and provides a good starting point in identi-
fying geographic areas with good potential [Ref. 5].
Another important environmental factor is the local
unemployment rate. Several studies indicate that high unem-
ployment has a positive effect on recruiting [Ref. 5, 8, and
14]. This is intuitively reasonable since people will turn
towards a secure income, the military, during hard economic
times. This effect was quite evident during 1982 when the
unemployment rate was high throughout the country and
recruiting was good for both guality and quantity for all of
the services.
The civilian-military pay ratio is another economic
factor which influences recruiting. When this ratio is
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high, meaning higher civilian pay relative to the military,
the effect on recruiting is negative. Although this rela-
tionship is expected, the possible interaction with unem-
ployment must be considered if both factors are included as
explanatory variables in the model.
Youth attitude toward the military is another environ-
mental factor which cannot be controlled. Recent surveys
indicate that the popularity of the military is on an
upswing from a very low level reached during the Vietnam era
[Ref. 15]. While popularity has a positive effect on
recruiting, as would be expected, this popularity is not
consistent across the country. Different regions seem to
experience different levels of popularity. The annual Youth
Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) , divides the country into
sixty-six regions with a rating for propensity to enlist
into the military. ^hile some of the services include this
as an explanatory variable for their supply models, the
Coast Guard will not include it because the rating is based
on a survey of propensity to enlist in one of the other
services. The survey excludes the propensity to enlist in
the Coast Guard, and it is not clear how this measurement of
attitude towards the military would fit into the Coast Guard
reward model.
Possible recruiting system factors which affect
recruiting include: office workload, advertising, the
programs offered, recruiter experience, and number of
recruiters, just to name a few. For the Coast Guard reward
model, the number of recruiters assigned to a geographical
area will be the only explanatory variable from the
recruiting system factors. This factor, number of recrui-
ters, is considered one of the most important variables
related to recruiting and is the easiest to quantify for
each geographic location. The other recruiting system vari-
ables are hard to define and even harder to measure. For
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the purpose of this study, the number of recruiters assigned
to a location will be synonymous with recruiting effort for
that location.
In a study done for the U.S. Army by General Research
Corporation [Ref. 5], the explanatory variables for their
cross sectional supply model included QMA, unemployment,
attitude towards the military, advertising, number of
recruiters, and number of canvassers. This represents one
set of explanatory variables which were considered appro-
priate fcr the prediction of Army enlistments. These vari-
ables would be nice to consider in the Coast Guard model,
however the construction of the reward model, the avail-
ability of the data, and the ultimate use of the model,
dictates that the Coast Guard Reward Model use a different
set of explanatory variables.
B. DATA AVAILABLE
Since the goal of the reward model is to predict the
recruiting reward for geographic locations both with and
without Coast Guard recruiting offices, it is hypothesized
that the performances of Navy recruiting efforts can be used
to predict the performance of Coast Guard efforts. If this
hypothesis is true, then it will be possible to predict the
reward of geographic locations for present and potential
Coast Guard recruiting offices. Using Navy data to predict
Coast Guard potential allows the prediction in areas where
there is no source of Coast Guard data and also overcomes
the problems caused by a lack of detailed Coast Guard data.
Even for the locations where the Coast Guard has recruiting
offices there is a lack of good dif ferentiable data beyond
that of total enlistments (i.e. there is no division into
mental categories or minority mental categories, etc.).
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The data used for this study were obtained from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (D.1DC) . The DMDC provided both
Coast Guard and Navy data for fiscal year 1983. The data
included information such as; home of record FTPS (Federal
Information Processing Series) code, highest year of educa-
tion, race, AFQT sccre, service of accession, and Coast
Guard recruiting office, for each applicant of both
services. Coast Guard and Navy. These data were then manip-
ulated into number of applicants, mean AFQT of applicants,
mean AFQT of accessions, number of accessions, number of
category I and II accessions, number of category I and II
applicants, number of minority category I and II accessions,
number of minority category I and II applicants, the number
of minority accessions, and the number of minority appli-
cants for both of the services. This list of variables of
Coast Guard data would become the possible components of the
reward value for each location, while the Navy data vari-
ables along with the number of Coast Guard recruiters at
each office would become the explanatory variables. In the
case of Coast Guard accessions, the number registered for
each office represents those enlistees that survived at
least nine months of Coast Guard service. This was a hidden
bonus since the number of accessions represents survivors
and, hence, is an aspect that should be rewarded.
Initial review of the Coast Guard data for the various
categories- suggested that some of the data values were
suspect. A closer ccmparison of numbers that are maintained
by the Coast Guard Headquarters Enlisted Recruiting Branch
revealed that many of the values obtained for the sixty-five
locations are in error. Elimination of the invalid data
points resulted in thirty-four locations on which future
calculations and estimations would be based. There was no
reasonable explanation for the inconsistent data results;
however, it is hypothesized that the Coast Guard's reporting
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procedure to the DMDC may have resulted in some offices not
receiving full credit for their recruiting efforts. The
loss of almost half of the original data suggests that
caution should be used when drawing conclusions from any
subsequent results. It is also possible that the remaining
data may have errors that could not be checked due tc the
lack of detailed data maintained by the Coast Guard.
After the invalid data were eliminated from the data
set, the first step involved exploratory data analysis. A
scatter plot of each variable mentioned above was made
against each of the other remaining variables for both Coast
Guard and Navy data. In addition the correlation coeffi-
cient was recorded for each comparison. This made it
possible tc get a better overall understanding of the data
and to identify outliers and relationships within the data.
Obvious relationships such as Navy applications versus Navy
accessions appeared as nearly straight lines, suggesting
that a strong relationship between these variables exists.
The resulting" correlation coefficient of .94 supports this
conclusion. It is necessary to be aware of these possible
interactions since it is not desirable to include two expla-
natory variables that are strongly interrelated.
This exploratory data analysis was also useful in iden-
tifying the most desirable variables to include in the model
for further analysis. The independent" variables that
ap-peared to be significant were number of Coast Guard
recruiters. Navy accessions. Navy category I and II acces-
sions, and Navy minority category I and II accessions. The
overall view of the data also proved helpful when analyzing
the subsequent regression results. A final result of the
exploratory data analysis was the confirmation of the fact
that the Coast Guard data was noisy.
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C. THE VARIABLES USEE IN THE REWARD MODEL
Although there are some limitations on the variables
considered for the reward model due to a lack of data, there
still exists a substantial set of possible variables to
represent both the dependent and independent variables of
the model. The dependent variable in this model represents
the reward assigned to each office. This reward will be
discussed in detail in the next section following a closer
look at the five variables that make up this single reward.
These five variables include applications, accessions,
category I and II accessions, minority category I and II
accessions, and minority accessions, all with respect to the
Coast Guard.
The first variable, applications for the Coast Guard, is
measured by those individuals that pursued the application
process to at least the level of taking the ASVAB test.
This eliminates the people who simply fill out a form or two
without any real interest in making a commitment. It is
hypothesized that an individual who sacrifices the time to
fill out the applications and take the ASVAB test is a
genuine candidate for enlistment, whereas someone who merely
contacts the office cr picks up some brochures is net neces-
sarily a serious candidate. The number of these applica-
tions is not limited by any quota system and is not directly
proportional to the cumber of recruiters, hence an office
that gets many serious applicants may represent a location
with very good potential. It will be assumed that the
potential of an office is positively related to the number
cf applicants at that office and, therefore, an office will
be rewarded with respect to the number of applications
received.
The next variable to be incorporated in the reward is
the number of accessions for each office. It has been
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pointed out that, due to the quota system, the number of
accessions for each office is directly proportional to the
number of recruiters. Because of this proportionality, it
is net appropriate to use the number of accessions as a
dependent variable while using the number of recruiters as
one of the explanatory variables. Because of this relation-
ship, the number of accessions will be measured by those
individuals who entered the Coast Guard in fiscal year 1S83
and remained on active duty until the time of this study, a
minimum of nine months service. This measurement was
achieved by DMDC through a cross comparison of individuals
on active duty at the time of this study with those individ-
uals who enlisted in fiscal year 1983, As a result, the
modified number of accessions represents individuals who
have survived the period of highest attrition (through boot
camp) , thus representing good recruits relative to time and
money involved from the signing of the enlistment contract
to the time of reporting to their first duty assignment.
This measurement also buffers the proportionality between
number of recruiters and number of accessions which is a
desired effect. Since recruits that survive at least nine
months of service represent a desired commodity, a large
number of these accessions implies a good recruiting loca-
tion, hence each office should be rewarded with respect to
the number of these accessions.
Another variable considered to be a reward is the number
of minority accessions into the Coast Guard- Again these
minority accessions represent those minority individuals who
have survived at least nine months of service. The Coast
Guard has a goal of at least twenty percent minority enlist-
ment each year. In order to reach this goal, the Coast
Guard has allocated a large number of resources ir. an
attempt to recruit more minorities. It is more difficult to
recruit minorities that meet the minimum Coast Guard
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standards than it is non-minorities. For this reason it is
assumed that an office that is able to recruit minorities
should te rewarded accordingly; hence, a positive reward is
assigned to each minority accession.
The final two reward variables are the category I and II
accessions and the ninority category I and II accessions.
These are measured by accessions that survive nine months of
service, have a AJ'QT score greater than sixty-four, and a
high school diploma. These accessions represent quality
accessions based on their mental category and education
level as discussed previously. Since the ultimate goal is
to improve quality while maintaining the appropriate quan-
tity, it is assumed that the quality of recruits from each
office should play a major role in the reward to that
office. Again, these quality accessions are not biased by
the quota system.
The explanatory, or independent, variables for the Coast
Guard model are all measures of Navy performance in the
various categories and the number of Coast Guard recruiters
at each location. The Navy variables are the same as the
five variables mentioned for the Coast Guard with the excep-
tion that they represent the values obtained by the Navy in
each location. The number of Coast Guard recruiters is
important since the recruiting results are a function of
effort. Since the hypothesis is to use Navy performance to
predict Coast Guard potential it is reasonable to use
similar measures of Navy performance to predict Coast Guard
potential. If there is a positive relationship between Navy
and Coast Guard recruiting, then the Coast Guard should be
willing to allocate resources in locations where the Navy
does well and compete for the relatively few accessions that
are required.
The explanatory variables mentioned above represent a
starting point for the model. The process of stepwise
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regression will elimirjate those variables that are not truly
explanatory and will keep those that are. It is necessary
to begin with variables that have some apriori justification
for being in the model to avoid predicting within a given
significance level using some unrelated variable.
D. EEWSED ASSIGNMENT
As previously mentioned, this study is using a "reward
model" instead of a "supply model" because the ultimate goal
is quality not quantity. This reward theory is also a
convenient buffer for the quantity bias created by the Coast
Guard quota system. To develop a reward value for each of
the offices with data, it was necessary to survey seme
recruiting experts to determine which categories were the
greatest assets to the Coast Guard. Once the categories
were racked from most important to least important, a
subjective weighting was given to each variable to differen-
tiate the levels of significance. It is assumed that these
recruiting experts are making the decisions for the Coast
Guard recruiting system, including those regarding the
quality of recruits. Hence, their subjective ranking and
weighting of the reward values should be consistent with the
quality goals of the Coast Guard.
The reward (dependent variable) assigned to each office
is defined by the following equation:
R = APF + 2(ACC) + 4(CATAC) + 4(MCATAC) +3(MINAC) (3.1)
where APP = number of Coast Guard applications,
ACC = number of Coast Guard accessions,
CATAC = number of Coast Guard category I and II
accessions,
MCATAC = number of Coast Guard minority category I
and II accessions, and
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MINAC = number of Coast Guard minority accessions.
It should be noted that each category is mutually exclusive
of the others (i.e. APP represents applications above and
beyond the other four categories). The weighting cf these
rewards is intuitively reasonable since the highest rated
reward is quality. Both minority and non-minority quality
are veighted on an equal basis. This suggests that improved
quality is more important than increased minority acces-
sions, since minority accessions are rated second highest.
This is followed by regular accessions because the irircrity
recruit is more difficult to obtain than the non-minority,
hence a higher reward should be given. The final variable
is applications. This variable is appropriate to include
because it represents a potential recruit. These applicants
pursued the enlistment process to a level indicating sincere
interest. Poor recruiter performance or a long waiting list
are possible reasons for an applicant not enlisting in the
Coast Guard. This suggest that applicants are valid irdica-
tors of potential recruits.
E. INITIAL REGRESSICH USING STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM
Once the list of independent variables was identified
and the dependent variable (reward) was defined, the actual
estimation of the parameters and the determination of the
independent variables which would remain in the model was
conducted. The statistical technique chosen was a stepwise
regression package available through the Statistical
Analysis System (SAS) . A review of the reward model
^ aO ,al ,,a2 an ,a ,-5 iiR- = e X-
.
X'
. . . . X . d. (3.2)
1 Ix 2i ni X
reveals that a logarithmic transformation must be completed
before estimating the parameters using a linear stepwise
regression. The transformation results in the following
equation
:
ln(R.)=aO + al ln(X ) + a2 ln(X^ )+...+ an In (X .) + a In (d . ) (3.3^1 li 2i ni X ^ '
where Ei = the weighted reward value for office i, and
Xli
X2i
?= the explanatory (independent) variables.
Xni
di
Once this transformation is aade, it is possible to
apply linear stepwise regression to estimate the parameters;
ao, al ,a2 ,. .
.
^an,a. Several regressions were conducted on
the data with various combinations of independent variables
and various weighting of the dependent variable to measure
the sensitivity of the model under varying conditions. In
addition, the level of significance for the independent
variable ertry into the model was varied to ensure that all
possible factors would have a chance to be considered.
F. EEGRZSSION BESULIS
The stepwise regression for the thirty-four locations
resulted in the following equation:
ln(R ) = A. 41 + .12 ln(NACC.) + .49 ln(d )
1 1 1
(3.4)
where NACC = number of Navy accessions at location i, and
di = number of Coast Guard recruiters in location i.
Taking the inverse log of Equation 3.4 results in the
following multiplicative model.
17 49
R. = 82.3 NACC d
1 11 (3.5)
As can be seen in Equation 3.5, the prediction model is
defined with only two explanatory variables. The presence
of the 'di' variable is expected, because it is assumed to
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be the most important factor influencing recruiting, and it
is this 'di* variable which will subsequently determine the
allocation of recruiters. The NACC variable implies that
the Coast Guard reward has some positive relationship with
the total number of Navy accessions. The elasticity of this
variable is represented by the .12 exponent. Since the NACC
variable is not highly correlated with any one of the depen-
dent variables it is reasonable to include it in the model.
To expound any further upon these variables seems inappro-
priate when considering the possible invalid data. It
suffices to note that each of the explanatory variables had
an apriori justification.
Closer investigation of the regression results shews an
R2 of about .63. This is considered a fair value when
dealing with quantitative social data. However, caution
must be used when making conclusions based on a large B."^
,
because the independent variables may make only a statis-
tical explanation and not the desired causal explanation
[Eef. 16].
The F probabilities for d and NACC were .000"l and .0058
respectively. These values imply that there is only a .0 1
percent probability that the d appears as an explanatory
variable by chance and likewise a .58 percent probability
for NACC. These are both very good significance levels and
suggest that both variables have been appropriately selected
as explanatory variables.
The variable that the model attempts to predict, reward,
was arrived at subjectively, hence to construct a very
complicated model with several explanatory variables could
not be justified as any better than the model above. The
results do suggest a relationship between Coast Guard poten-
tial and Navy performance, which deserves further investiga-
tion. It seems that a better model could be obtained if the
Coast Guard could provide the necessary accurate data, Ihe
U3
remaining steps in determining the optimal Coast Guard
recruiting locations yill be carried out under the assump-
tion that the above model is valid.
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IV. DETERMINING OPTIMAL LOCATION WITH DYNAMIC PEQGRAMMING
A. PECBIEH STATEMENT
Since this study attempts to determine the optimal loca-
tions for recruiting offices, the problem will be defined in
terms of the goals and constraints placed upon the Coast
Guard Recruiting Branch. The present budget constraints for
Coast Guard recruiting allows for 242 recruiters and sixty-
five offices, and the money for these resources is assumed
to be available in the following years. It is also assumed
that the fixed cost cf an office is the same for all loca-
tions. Hence, for each office closed, a new one will be
opened so as to maintain sixty-five locations. For adminis-
trative purposes, the Coast Guard desires to have a minimum
of tvo and not more than six recruiters per office. This is
to facilitate leave, continuity during transfers, keeping
the office open while one recruiter is on the road, etc. If
the objective function of the problem is defined by maxim-
izing the reward at each office, where the reward is
predicted by the rexard model, then the problem can be
formulated as follows:




S.t. y~ d. = 242
2:^d^ < 6 for all i,
N = 65, and
d. = an integer.
1 ^
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For the purpose of this stady, the Coast Guard
Recruiting Branch supplied a list of eleven potential loca-
tions to possibly replace present offices with the least
desirable reward. These locations were picked based on
several logical characteristics including Coast Guard visi-
bility, population, relative location to existing Coast
Guard facilities, etc. This study looked at the seventy-six
locations, sixty-five existing and eleven potential sites,
eliminated the eleven locations with the lowest predicted
rewards, and determined the recruiter allocation necessary
to optiiEize the reward of the remaining sixty-five
locations.
B. TBE APPLICATION CF DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
The mathematical programming problem proposed in
Equation 4. 1 is depicted as a dynamic programming problem in
Figure 4-1 .
2£d ^ 6, X
n n




Figure 4. 1 Dynamic Programming Formulation.
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where di = the integer decision variable, number of
recruiters at office i,
Xi = the total lumber of recruiters available at
stage i, the dynamic programming state variable,
N = total number of stages (65) , each stage represents
a recruiting office,
Ri = the reward for office i.
As discussed earlier, Ri is the reward function developed in
Chapter III, where:
R. = z d-^^ (^^.2)
1 i i
Each 2i is a predetermined value from Equation 3.5 . This
value differs among recruiting offices but is constant with
respect to a given office.
The recursive equation for solving this problem is
f.(X.)=Max (H^ - f^_,(X^_,)) i = 1, 2 N,
^^^3^




= X.-d. i = 1, 2, . ,
.
, N, and1-1 1 1
It may be noted that the constraint of maintaining
exactly sixty-five offices is not accommodated in this
model. One possible solution to meet this constraint is to
add another decision variable to the dynamic programming
formulation. This decision variable, in addition to the
decision, 'di', number of recruiters at office i, would be
an indicator type variable, where the value one would repre-
sent the decision to have an office at the given stage loca-
tion and a zero would be the decision not to have an office.
This indicator variable would be constrained such that the
sum of the indicators would equal sixty-five. While the
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addition of a decision variable and corresponding state
variable is feasible, it is undesirable because of the
resulting increase in dimensionality of the dynamic program-
ming problem. The number of computations rises exponen-
tially with each state variable, hence the problem can
become prohibitive as variables are added. In the small
problem attempted in this study, the size can be handled
with the added variables, however it is not necessary if the
simplicity of the reward function is exploited to account
for the 'number of offices' constraint.
Review of Equation 4.2 shows that the reward function
for each office is a convex function. Each of the seventy-
six locations considered has a unic^ue Zi value, a constant
for that office. It can be shown that the eleven locations
with the smallest Zi value can be eliminated from the
problem and the resulting solution obtained from the
remaining sixty-five locations and the single decision,
single state variable model, will have the same optimal
solution obtained frcm the dynamic programming problem with
the additional decision and state variables. This can be
proved by showing that an office eliminated from the solu-
tion of cne recruiter per office (i.e. sixty-five recruiters
available) , will not return to the solution as more recrui-
ters (resources) are added, while maintaining the limit of
sixty-five offices. This may be stated in the following
way.
If the total number of recruiters available for alloca-
tion is sixty-five and only one recruiter may be assigned to
an office, then the sixty-five offices chosen to optimize
the total reward will be the same offices that optimize the
problem for 2U2 recruiters and a limit of sixty-five
offices. To see this let R1(k), R2 (k) , ..., R76 (k) be the
reward values for each office if k recruiters are assigned
to the offices. Let £ be the set of offices eliminated from
US
the protlem with a resource of 65 recruiters, where one
recruiter is allocated to each of sixty-five offices cut of
seventy-six total offices. Then S is the set of offices
with the eleven lowest Zi values. To confirm this it is
necessary to note that if Ri(1)< Rj(1)/ then Ri(k)<: Bj (k)
for all k. If this were not so, then the optimal solution
with a constraint of 242 recruiters and 65 offices could
include an office in set S. That is: Ri (k) >Rj(k) where i
represents an office eliminated in the 65 recruiter, 65
offices problem, and j is an office included in this 'one
recruiter per office' case. But this is not possible
because: Ri = Zi * di -^^ and if Zi*1-*9<Zj*1 -^^ then Zi*k
•*^<Zj*k .^ must be true. Hence, the additional state
variable and decision variable can be avoided by eliminating
the eleven lowest Zi offices and solving the subsequent
dynamic programming problem using the remaining sixty-five
locations. The final step determines the optimal allocation
of recruiters for the best sixty-five offices. The
resulting problem fits the description in Figure 4.1, and
can be solved using only one state and decision variable,
the number of recruiters.
C. BCN-INTEGEE SOLOTION
Before discussing the dynamic programming technique used
for solving this problem, it is worthwhile looking at a
non-integer dynamic programming algorithm which results from
the convex nature of the objective function in this problem.
Rhile the optimal solution of this technique does not
provide integer results, it does provide valuable insight
into the process, gives an approximate estimate as a deci-
sion aid, and is very simple and easy to implement using
existing Coast Guard resources.
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Assuming that the Zi is greater than zero for all i, it
can be shown [ Eef . 17], that the following recursive equa-
tions represent the optimal allocation decision for each
stage
.
d. = Q. X.Ill (4.4)




( Z. / K. ^
1 1-1
l/(l-a)
/ i = 2,3,
1 + ( Z. / K. )
1 1-1
l/(l-a)
,N; Q^ = 1. (4.6)
(4.7)
K. = Z. Q^ + K.
^ (1-Q.
)^
1 11 1-1 ^1 , i = 2,3,...,N; K^ = 2^.
These simple recursive equations can be programired on
the Coast Guard's C3 computer to provide a readily available
decision aid for future use by the Coast Guard Recruiting
Branch. Although the above algorithm will not provide an
integer solution, it may be a valuable tool sufficient for
Coast Guard requirements and budget constraints. Assuming
that any reward or supply model developed from quantitative
social data will only provide an approximate decision aid,
the non-integer solution may be a more reasonable approach,
based on its simplicity. Once this program is implemented,
it can be adapted for annual redistribution of recruiters at
already established offices, assigning quotas to offices,
evaluating recruiter performance, and several other opti-
mization schemes which may be of interest. These applica-
tions are valid assuming a valid reward function can be
derived.
Although this method does not give an integer solution,
the program was written and tested (without the constraints
on d) for the problem described in this paper. The optimal
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solution ohtained was cot the same as the integer solution
for ctvicus reasons, however the relative implications were
consistent to those attained in the integer solution. As a
decision aid, the non-integer solution appears to be helpful
and may he sufficient for Coast Guard requirements.
E. TEE INTEGER SOLUTION OSING DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
The first step, tefore applying dynamic programming, was
to identify the geographical locations of the eleven poten-
tial offices. These locations provided by the Coast Guard
Recruiting Branch, were designated by the major city within
the area and are listed in Table IV .
TABLE 17











Salt Lake City UT
To determine the boundaries of the locations, the
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA, formerly known as
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas or SHSA's) were
used. The MSA's were defined and published by the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) in June of 1983. These
geographical areas represent metropolitan areas
"...consisting of a large population nucleus together with
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adjacent communities and areas having a high degree of
economic and social integration with that nucleus."
[Ref. 18]. The OME has specific rules to determine the
qualification cf an area as an MSA as follows:
1. A city of at least 50,000 population, or
2. An urbanized area of at least 50,000 with a total
metropolitan population of at least 100,000.
CIB established these MSA's "...to enable all Federal
statistical agencies to use common definitions when studying
metropolitan characteristics." [Ref. 18]. It is assumed
that the MSA represents the most logical choice for
geographic boundaries for the researcher without specific
location knowledge.
Once these boundaries were decided, it was possible to
evaluate the Zi value for all seventy-six locations. The Zi
were estimated using the reward model developed in Chapter
III, Equation 3.5 and are shown in Table V . The eleven
locations with the lowest Zi values were dropped from the
problem. These office locations are listed in Table VI .
It is interesting to look at the offices which have been
eliminated. However, to draw conclusions without further
investigation of the data may result in erroneous decisions.
San Francisco, for example, seems like an unlikely choice to
eliminate. This may have resulted from poor data (i.e. the
San Jose office receiving credit for the San Francisco
office), or it may be that San Francisco is not the place to
be for recruiting into the Coast Guard. Some of the ether
locations that have been eliminated coincide with intuition,
such as Helena, Boise, Yakima, and Monterey. However, it is
again necessary to investigate further, in light of the data
used in this study.
The remaining sixty-five locations were used in a
dynamic programming package to determine the optimal alloca-
tion of the 242 recruiters. The solution produced has
integer values as desired and can be seen in Table VII .
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TABLE V
Zi Values For All Locations
Location Zi Value
Portland ME 162.3
Boston MA 189. 6
Providence RI 165.4










St Louis MO 182. 1
Memphis TN 175.2
Minneapolis MN 168.3
Kansas City MO 172.2
Omaha NE 153. 6
Denver CO 182.2
New York NY 209. 7
Freeport NY 189.4
Newark NJ 202.9
Philadelphia PA 205. 8
Wilkes-Barr PA 177.3
Hartford CT 19 1.3





Salisbury MD 1 3 5., 5
Richmond VA 179.0
Glen Eernie MD 178.0
Alexandria VA 142. 6
Morehead City NC 170.4
Raleigh NC 153.0
Greensboro NC 166. 3
Roanoke VA 146. 6
Miami FL 187.9
Jacksonville FL 178.3
Tampa Bay FL 183. 3
Atlanta GA 185.7
Biriringham AL 170. 8
Motile AL 180. 3
New Orleans LA 175.2
Jackscn MS 146. 1
Houston TX 191. 1
Dallas TX 180.6






Detroit MI 201, 4
Niles IL 199. 1






Cerritos CA 207. 2
San Francisco CA 142. 6
San Jose CA 168.4
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Table V (conf d.)






























































The solution shown in Table VII represents the optimal
allocation of 242 recruiters over the sixty-five best
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TABLE VII
Optimal Allocation of Recruiters
Location 1984 Optimal Change
Portland ME 3 3
Boston MA 5 4-1
Providence RI 3 2 -1
New Bedford Ma 2 4 2
Manchester NH 3 3
Worcester MA 2 3 1
Springfield MA 4 4
Pittsfurg PA 4 4
Cincinnati OH 4 4
Louisville KY 3 3
St Louis MO 4 4
Memphis TN 3 4 1
Minneapolis MN 3 3
Kansas City MO 3 4 1
Omaha NE 3 3
Denver CO 3 4 1
New York NY 5 5
Freepcrt NY 4 4
Newark NJ 4 5 1
Philadelphia PA 6 5 -1
Wilkes-Barr PA 3 4 1
Hartford CT 5 -1
Altany NY 3 3
Harrisburg PA 5 4 -1
Norfolk VA 6 4 -2
Salisbury MD 2 0-2
Richmond VA 4 4
Glen Eernie HD 4 4
Alexandria VA 4 -4
Morehead City NC 4 4
Raleigh NC 2 3-1
Greensboro NC 5 3 -2
Roanoke VA 2 0-2
Miami FL 6 4
Jacksonville FL 7 3 -4
Tampa Bay FL 6 4-2
Atlanta GA 8 4
Birmirgham AL 3 4 1
Mobile AL 4 4
New Orleans LA 5 4 -1
Jackscn MS 3 0-3
Houston TX 6 4 -2
Dallas TX 5 -1
San Antonio TX 5 4 -1
Albuquerque NM 2 4 2
Buffalo BY 4 4
Cleveland OH 5 -1
Detroit MI 3 5 2
Niles IL 3 5 2
Milwaukee ^I 3 3
Phoenix AZ 3 4 1
San Diego CA 3 4 1
Encino CA 3 3
Cerritos CA 4 5 1
San Francisco CA 4 -4
San Jose CA 5 3-2
55
Table VII (c ont 'i.)
Optimal Allocation of Recruit ers
Location 1984 0£timal Chanqe
Sacramento CA 3 4 1
Helena MT 2 -2
Boise ID 2 -2
Spokane WA 2 3 1
Yakima WA 2 -2
Seattle WA 3 4 1
Portland OR 3 3
San Juan PR 4 3 -1
Honolulu HI 1 3 2
Savannah GA
Charleston SC 3 3
Salt lake City UT
Monterey CA
Knoxville TN 3 3
Oklahoma City OK 3 3
Santa Barbara CA 3 3
Orlando FL 3 3
Columbus OH 3 3
Passaic NJ 3 3
Anchorage AK 5 5
.
, -
offices. This solution is valid only if the reward model
developed in Chapter III is valid. Since it has been
pointed out that, due to poor data, the validity of the
reward model is in question, decisions based on this solu-
tion should be made with extreme caution. Although these
results may not be valid, it is useful to interpret the
solution to gain further insight into the problem and to
serve as a guideline for future work with better data.
The numbers in the column M98U' represent the present
allocation of recruiters. A zero indicated that there is no
office at this location at the present time. The values
greater than zero represent the actual number of recruiters
assigned to the corresponding office. The 'Optimal' column
indicates the number of recruiters that should be assigned
at each location to achieve the 'optimal' reward, based on
the reward model developed earlier. In this case a zero
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implies that there should not be an office assigned at the
given location. This solution is based on the constraints
discussed earlier, hence there could be significant changes
in the allocation if some of the constraints were varied.
For this reason, the constraints of the problem should be
carefully developed tc avoid constraints that are actually
goals. The final cclumn, 'Change* represents the required
change from present tc 'optimal' allocation.
Survey of the results shows changes of one or two
recruiters in several of the offices. Since the reward
model is a function of Navy accessions in a given location,
the offices with the smaller 'optimal' values indicate areas
where Navy recruiting was not as good relative to locations
with larger 'optimal' values. If the assumption that good
Navy recruiting locations imply good Coast Guard recruiting
locations is true, then the shift of recruiters would be
appropriate. Again, this depends on the validity of the
data.
Another interesting result is that approximately 86
percent of the offices have an 'optimal' allocation of three
or four. Since most of the locations are metropolitan
areas, the number of Navy accessions is relatively close for
these areas. When this value is raised to the .12 power to
obtain the Zi estimate, the resulting figure is even closer
in magnitude. Some of this resulting closeness could be
avoided with more explanatory variables. The Zi value is
then multiplied by the decision variable 'di' (number of
recruiters), raised to the .49 power. As a result of the
mathematics involved, the offices have similar allocation
values with the exception of those with extremely large Zi
values. The offices with four recruiters have a Zi value
about 1.15 times the Zi value of offices assigned three
recruiters. To move up from a four man office to a five man
office, the Zi ratio is about 1.11. These ratios will
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always exist with a reward function made up of a Zi value
multiplied by a single decision variable raised to some
power
.
A lock at the 'new' locations suggests an interesting
result. Anchorage is the only office that enters with a
value greater than three. The five that Anchorage receives
is a result of its large Zi value, and implies that the Navy
does very well in this area. Even if the reward model is
not valid, the potential of Anchorage should be investigated
further.
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V- CONCIDSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to determine the optimal
location of sixty-five Coast Guard recruiting offices with
242 recruiters. Recruiting office relocation was identified
as one of several methods available to improve Coast Guard
recruiting quality. Quality was defined in terms of AFQT
category and level of education, with 'good quality' repre-
senting those individuals in the upper sixty-five percentile
on the AFQT and a high school education. It was assumed
that this group of individuals was supply limited and could
be predicted using a multiplicative model.
Since the Coast Guard is interested in quality and not
quantity, it was assumed that each office could te rated
based on the quality of recruits and the potential at each
office. It was also assumed that Navy recruiting perform-
ance could be used to predict Coast Guard recruiting poten-
tial in locations where Coast Guard recruiting offices did
not exist. A multiplicative 'reward model' was developed to
predict a reward value for any location under consideration.
A higher reward value implied more potential or a better
recruiting office location. This reward model was
constructed using stepwise regression on the log transforma-
tion of the dependent and independent variables. Paucity
and possible errors in the Coast Guard data precluded strong
conclusions about the reward model and subsequent results
using the reward model. However, the method should produce
a valid model if accurate data is obtained.
The solution to the problem was carried out under the
assumption that the reward model was valid. A dynairic
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programming technique was used to determine the best sixty-
five out of seventy-six locations considered and the corre-
sponding number of recruiters to assign to each office. A
non-integer dynamic programming algorithm was introduced and
was found to be very easily implemented using present Coast
Guard resources. This non-integer technique is considered
sufficient for Coast Guard requirements and is very adequate
for use with quantitative social data. It was also shown
that due to the convex nature of the reward function, elimi-
nation of the lowest eleven reward values would result in
the same optimal solution as the dynamic programming tech-
nique with an additional constraint. The results obtained
from the dynamic programming technique were interesting,
however specific conclusions about placement of Coast Guard
recruiting offices were avoided because of the poor quality
of data used to build the model. This study has resulted in
some general conclusions and recommendations which will be
discussed in the next two sections.
B. CCNCIOSIONS
The first conclusion that must be considered before
implementing any changes in recruiting office location
concerns the data. The detailed Coast Guard data obtained
from DMDC was compared with raw numbers maintained by the
Coast Guard Recruiting Branch. As a result, thirty-one of
the sixty-five offices were eliminated from the regression
step due to major discrepancies. Because the Coast Guard
does not maintain detailed information (i.e. AFQT score and
level of education) for each recruit, it was not possible to
validate the specific data of the remaining thirty-four
locations. Thus the Coast Guard variables used to construct
the dependent variable could not be verified for errors.
This leads to the conclusion that the Coast Guard data used
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in this study may be inaccurate. The cause of the discrep-
ancies have not been identified; however, the collection of
accurate data should not present a difficult task for the
Coast Guard, Decisions based on the data used in this study
should be deferred until accurate data can be collected.
The literature that was reviewed during the course of
this study strongly supports the validity of a multiplica-
tive 'supply model'. The other services rely on this type
of model to predict enlistments. The Coast Guard is inter-
ested in quality not quantity. If the Coast Guard can
define and identify quality recruits then it is possible to
give a quality rating to each recruiting office. The value
of the rating itself is not significant, however comparison
of the value with other offices can provide a technique to
determine which offices have the potential for better
quality. The use of a reward model to predict potential
quality of an office relative to another is feasible.
Although the data used in this study was considered
questionable, the resulting model does support the use of
Navy performance to predict Coast Guard potential in loca-
tions where there is no Coast Guard data. This concept can
be used as a decision aid if the Coast Guard is considering
opening a new office in a location where there are no Coast
Guard data.
Statistical Metropolitan Areas are a good set of bound-
aries to use for recruiting offices when specific knowledge
of an area is not available. The SMA's which were defined
by the CMB represent metropolitan areas with a common
economic and social integration- These predetermined areas
provide a good starting point until further information is
available to make adjustments in the boundaries.
Once the Coast Guard is satisfied with its recruiting
locations the multiplicative model can be constructed using
Coast Guard data and local environmental and demographic
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iriforma tion. Using Coast Guard iata instead of Navy data
will result in a better model because there is a stronger
relationship between previous Coast Guard performance and
future Coast Guard potential than there is between Navy
performance and Coast Guard potential. A model that uses
last year's Coast Guard performance as a independent vari-
able to predict the next year's potential is more intui-
tively reasonable than a model that uses Navy performance to
predict Coast Guard potential.
Provided that a valid reward model can be obtained/
dynamic programming is a reasonable method to aid many
recruiting decisions. Some of the possible applications are
recruiter allocation, quota assignment, boundary definition,
recruiter performance evaluation, and recruiter time alloca-
tion with respect to specific locations within a territory.
Since the basic model involves quantitative social data, the
non-integer dynamic programming algorithm using recursive
equations is a sufficient and reasonable approach when used
with good judgement.
Most of the seventy-six locations that were considered
in this study were good locations. There are some obvious
exceptions such as Helena, Boise, Yakima, and Monterey. The
remaining locations all have a similar potential and there-
fore subjective judgement could be used to reduce the number
of locations to sixty-five. Once the sixty-five offices are
obtained, the allocation of recruiters can be completed
using the reward model and dynamic programming.
C. EECCHHENDATIONS
A reasonable method to predict Coast Guard performance
has been demonstrated using a relationship between Coast
Guard and Navy recruiting performance. The cost effective-
ness of this method may be less than that achieved by good
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judgement. If locations are carefully selected and satisfy
apriori conditions, then the recruiting performance of these
locations should be approximately correct. The method of
'good judgement' is more flexible in meeting political and
administrative constraints. One possible approach for
determining locations and the corresponding territories, is
to use the Standard Metropolitan Areas. Once the locations
are picked the Coast Guard can collect good data, then
develop a model from this data combined with current envi-
ronmental and demographic data. This model should be more
accurate for recruiter allocation, quota assignment,
performance evaluation, and other Coast Guard decisions,
than a model that uses Navy data as an explanatory variable.
It has been assumed that the annual cost of recruiting
would be the same regardless of the location of the offices
if the number of offices and recruiters remain constant. As
a result of this assumption, there is no cost consideration
in this model. It may be necessary to develop a model that
considers cost as a factor before making changes in any
locations. A cost benefit comparison between recruiting
office and recruiter is another model which may prove
fruitful. The trade off between these two items, recruiting
office and recruiter, may result in more locations with
fewer total recruiters or vice versa.
Based on the results of the current study, the Coast
Guard should further investigate the opening of an office in
Anchorage. There is strong evidence of high quality
recruiting potential in this area. The Coast Guard should
also consider reallocating some recruiters as shown in Table
VI of Chapter IV. One obvious imbalance is four recruiters
in San Juan versus one recruiter in Honolulu.
During the course of this study there were a few ideas
related to recruiting which were not directly related to the
'optimal location* problem. These ideas deserve mention
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since they may help improve the present recruiting system.
The first item that should be reviewed is the quota system.
The present system is simple and easy to implement, however
it assumes that each office has equal potential for each
recruiter. This method would be reasonable if optimal allo-
cation of recruiters has been established. Based en the
origin of the present system, optimal allocation has not
been achieved, hence the quota system is not reasonable.
The quota system should take into account the potential of
the area based on previous performance and recruiter experi-
ence. To assign quotas blindly is a disservice to both the
Coast Guard and the recruiter.
Another item which can be easily improved is the lack of
communication within the Coast Guard recruiting system.
Under present conditions, if Honolulu has five quality
applicants but only one quota for the month, four of the
applicants must go on a waiting list. If at the same time
San Juan has four quotas and only marginally qualified
applicants, these four marginal applicants will be enlisted
while four quality applicants wait in Honolulu. This
problem can be easily corrected in the future when each
recruiting office has a computer terminal that is connected
to a central data base. However in the interim, one
possible solution is to define a higher minimum standard for
enlistment. If an office cannot meet quota with this new
standard, then the quota will be transferred to an office
with a waiting list. The Coast Guard should keep track of
waiting lists to assist in future quota and recruiter
allocations.
A final suggestion is to develop a recruiter incentive
program. Since the recruiter is the ultimate resource to
obtain quality recruits, the motivation of each recruiter is
important to the overall success of the recruiting program.
There are many different types of programs which have been
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used by the other services and corporations throughout the
world. These methods are proven and can be found in various
management science publications. A well designed recruiter
incentive program for the Coast Guard can result in great
benefits for both the recruiters and the Coast Guard.
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